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CmPTBR I

INTRODUCTION:

SOME QMERAL REMA.RKS ON SLA?lRt AND
POLITICS, 1787-1819

The problem of slavery in the new nation perplexed and exas
perated the learned statesmen who were given the task of formulating
a constitution for the victorious republic. Americans on both sides
of the Mason-Dixon line seemed to agree mutually that the anomalous
institution of slavery was morally wrong.

However, the fact remained

that almost half of the thirteen original states had apologetically
accepted slavery as part of their social and economic way of life.^
Confronted with this actuality, the founding fathers at the
Constitutional Convention were obliged to contrive an agreement which
would settle this vexing moral-economic question lest the new-born
countiy be severed by geographic disunion.

The solution to this

dilemma consisted of two hard-fought compromises.
The first concordance related to slaves and the apportioning
of representation in Congress.

Southern delegates wished slaves to

be counted in the apportioning of representatives for the lower house.
Northerners objected to this proposal, stating that slaves were to
be regarded only as property.

They argued that if slaves should be

considered in apportionment, they should also be federally taxed as

^Williaffl Sumner Jenkins, Pro-Slaveiy Thought in the Old South
(Chapel Rill, 1935), PP- hQ-k9.

1

2
persons.
ers.

The latter overture proved extremely abhorrent to Southern

Southern delegates insisted that slave representation in Con

gress be instituted lest any future attempt would be made by the
North to abolish slavery.

This resolution was further accentuated

with a Southern threat to leave the Convention if affirmative action
2
was not taken on their plan.

Finally an agreement was reached that in apportioning repre
sentation and direct taxes among the states, three-fifths of the
slaves should be counted as part of the population.-^
compromise, neither side was thoroughly satisfied.

As with any

Nevertheless,

the three-fifths agreement, which was referred to as the "federal
ratio compromise," staved off a potential split in the Union and
helped promote a political balance of power between the North and
South.^
The second slavery compromise related to the so-called African
slave trade.

This act set a twenty year limit (with January 1, l8o8,

as the date of expiration) on the importation of slaves.^ During
this period of time each state could pass legislation regulating its

6
own state trade.

^Clement Eaton, A History of the Old South (New York, 19ii9),
pp. l!42-li43.
""
^Constitution of the United States, Article one. Section two.
^Harry J. Carman and Harold C. ,^rett, A History of the
American People (New York, 1952), I, p. 210. ""
^Constitutlorj, Article one. Section nine.
Jenkins, o£. clt., p. 1^9.

Despite the actuality that some Northern abolitionists wanted
an immediate end to the slave trade, the twenty year limit pleased
most Northerners for they believed that slavery would slowly wither
away if it was denied replenishment through foreign slave trade»
Further, from an econondc point of view, New England shipping inter
ests would profit by a twenty year continuation of the triangular
trade.
But one must not overlook the benefits it gave the South.
Not only did the South have a twenty year extension of slave trade,
but it also had a means of preserving the high price of its Negro
"property."

The method was as simple as the supply and demand

principle.

Slave owners and slave traders alike agreed that in

order for slave prices to remain high the number of slaves must be
g
limited.
In addition, some states, especially Virginia and Maryland,
9
prospered as slave breeding areas.

Needless to say, this prosperity

would not have been so great if the market had been flooded by Afri
cans.

Professor Ulrich Bonnell Phillips noted four Southern consi

derations against an unlimited slave trades (l) an abundance of
slave labor would lead to a large increase in staple exports and
therefore low world mart pricesj (2) it would result in excessive

"^Eaton, 0£. cit., p. lUU.
O
Ulrich Bonnell Phillips, American Negro Slavery (New Tork,
1918), p. 133.
^Lewis Cecil Gray, History of Agriculture in the Southern
United States to i860 (Washington, 1933), II, pp.T6l-663.

li
debt to outside interests; (3) it would hinder the civilizing of
Negroes already on hand; and (U) an adverse proportion of blacks to
whites would heighten the dangerous possibility of slave insurrec
tions.^^

Thus, in retrospect, it is evident that this limitation

on slave trade benefited all parties to some extent.
In the subsequent twenty-two year epoch, i.e., 1787 to l8l9,
there was a relative tranquility between the North and South concern
ing the salient issue of slavery.

Only on rare occasions was slavery

openly debated in Congress.During the latter part of this period
12
some anti-slavery agitation was initiated by varioiis church groups,
but this, for the most part, was executed on a minor s c a l e . I n
general, however, it should be noted that the North opposed the
"peculiar institution" on moral grounds.

The South countered by

saying that the slave was absolutely essential for the maintenance
of its large-scale and expanding agrarian econot^ which was becoming
increasingly dependent upon slave labor. Furthermore, Southerners
stated that Negroes were an inferior race which

must be controlled

by the white man "if civilization were to be preserved."

I

Some

^^Phillips, 0£. cit., pp. 133-13ii.
^^Jenkins, o£. cit., pp. ii8-ii9.
^^Ptobably the most prominent and persistent in this movement
were the Quakers.
^^Jenkins, o£. cit., pp. U9-?0.
^^Harold R. Bruce, American Parties and Politics (New York,
1936), p. 99.
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believed that they were doing the Negro a service by rescuing him
from the African wilds and assimilating him into a more advanced
western culture.

Moreover, emancipation seemed out of the question

because it would lead to economic and social difficulties — namely
the problem of finding work for these unskilled slavesj and the
problem of Negroes being "driven into every species of crime for
15
subsistence! and destined to a life of idleness, anxiety and gailt."
While there were some who would defend slavery as a positive
good, most Southerners were, in varying degrees, quite apologetic
about the entire issue. They felt themselves the unfortunate in
heritors of a legacy which might gradually be rectified to the
satisfaction of all concerned.

On numerous occasions responsible

Southern spokesmen openly admitted that slaveiy was a "grave social
-1 Z

problem."

And, in fact, certain prominent figures took steps to

correct the nation's blight.

Ctoe such effort was the American Colon

ization Society. Founded in Washington in I817, this organization
sought to alleviate the Negro problem by sponsoring the israigration
and settlement of American Negroes to Liberia where th^ could develop
their own country. The society enjoyed the active support of some
influential Southern men such as Speaker of the House Heniy Clay,
John Eager Howard, Samuel Smith, and John C. Herbert of Maryland,

^^Phillips, The Course of the South to Secession (New York,
1939), p. 90.
^^Charles S. Sydnor, The Development of Southern Sectionalism,
I8l9-l8h8 (Baton Rouge, 19^877"P- 95.

6
John Taylor of Caroline, General Andrew Jackson, and General John
Mason, District of Coluraibia.

These six men, together with seven

distinguished Northerners, were selected as the thirteen original
17
vice-presidents of the organization.
Other Southerners such as Thomas Jefferson, John Randolph,
and George Washington exhibited a benevolent behavior toward their
slaves.

By instituting various reforms on their own plantations

(e.g., improvement of living and working conditions and the freeing
of slaves upon the owner's death) it was hoped that more slave
holders would follow their example. But, unfortunately, after the
invention of the cotton gin, the profit incentive helped stifle
any trend toward gradual emancipation.
An analysis of the period from 178? to l8l9 brings to light
a number of state and national acts which promoted Ihe aforesaid
degree of harmony.

To begin with. Northern fears of being surrounded

by slave states were abated by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787

T8

which excluded slavery in the territory from the Alleghenies to the
Mississippi.

On the other hand. Southern slaveholders were free to

settle in territory south of the Ohio and, after the Louisiana

I'i'p. J. Straudenraus, The African Colonization Movement, I8l61865 (NewTork, 1961), pp. 29^.
^®The Ordinance was largely based upon the Ordinance of 178!^
which was drafted by a committee headed by Jefferson. Under the
original plan slavery would be excluded from the entire West after
the year 1800. This clause, however, failed to pass Congress. Need
less to say, the striking out of that section was a victory for the
Southj and it helped sustain the delicate North-South equilibrium.

7
Purchase in I803, west of the Mississippi.^^
While the North was able to achieve partial victories through
varioTis coDiproBiises in 178?, slave states won a smashing coup de
maatre in the Fugitive Slave Act of 1793•

This law, which was

passed unanimously in the Senate and by a forty-eight to seven vote
in the lower house, provided for the extradition of fugitive slaves
to their original masters.

Passage of this bill was definitely a

triumph for the South. Further, this act was significant as a legal
means of alluring potentially explosive disputes between Northern
and Southern states.

20

In the realm of party politics there was for the most part a
keen balance between North-South interests.

Historians generally

agree that political parties did not evolve until the latter part
of Washington's first term. In the subsequent decade party lines
solidified and the newly-forraed Democratic-Republican party, which
was chiefly supported by agrarians and the lower economic strata of
America, seemed favorably disposed toward the interests of slavery.
In a sense this was a marriage of necessity.

Although Jefferson's

party had substantial support from Northern farmers, small business
men, city workers, and the middle class in general, it still needed
Southern votes to insure victory in the election of I8OI. From the

^^Homer Car^ Hockett, Political and Social Growth of the
United States, 1^92-18^2 (New Tork, 193U7rp. 270.
^^Henry Wilson, EH.story of the Rise and Fall of the Slave
Power in America (Boston, 1875), I, p. 6j John Hope Franklin, From
Slavery to Freedom, second edition (New Tork, I960), p. l50.

8
standpoint of the South, slave owners and non-slaveholders were
obliged to sustain a party which was -asTially sympathetic to their

21
interests.

Within the Itefflocratic-Republican party there seemed

to be a degree of understanding between representatives from the
free North and the slaveholding South.

Party members from both

regions recognized the moral wrongs of slavery and there existed a
Southern hope that eventually the "peculiar institution" would be
come obsolete.
But whatever possibilities there were for the gradual elim
ination of slavery were rudely shattered by an unemployed twentyeight year old Connecticut schoolmaster.

Eli Wiitney's invention

of the cotton gin in 1793 resurrected slavery from its unprofitability, thereby instilling slavery as a lucrative and seemingly
22
permanent institution.

Prior to this time Negro labor was primar

ily used in the cultivation of three cropss indigo, rice, and tobacco.
However, income from such

endeavours was waning because of decreas-

ing demand and falling prices.

23

Thus an economic life-or-death

situation for slavery had been rapidly evolving.
At this crucial time the cotton gin liberated slavery from
the economic doldrums it had occupied.

The marvelous machine trans-

fomed a relatively unprofitable commodity into the king^ of the

21

Eaton,

0£.

cit., p. 171.

22
Constance M. Qreen, Eli Ihitney and the Birth of American
Technology (New York, 19^6), pp. iB, 3^-37, IiU.
^^James A, B. Scherer, Cotton as World Power (New York, 1916),
pp. lU^-li47.

9
agrarian realm.

No longer would slaves need to devote a full day's

2k
work for the preparation of one or two pounds of lint.

Instead of

spending countless hours picking cotton seeds, slave labor could be
utilized to cultivate more cotton for the insatiable appetite of the
new machine.
In addition to the cotton gin, cotton production was further
complemented by prior and subsequent technological advances in the
British textile industry.

Edmund Gartwright's power loom, Samuel

Crompton's "mule," James Hargreaves' "spinning jenr^," Richard
Arkwright's "water frame," British manufacturing ingenuity, ¥hitn^*s cotton gin, and the South's productive cotton fields — all
united in a capitalistic venture which proved worthwhile for all
25
(i.e., white men) concerned.
For the next few decades the South had an ever-growing demand
for its white fiber.

The South responded with remarkable efficiency.

In the year prior to the invention of the cotton gin, the total
production of raw cotton was 6,270 bales (one bale weighing approx26
imately 500 pounds).

Early in 1793 Whitney invented his astonish-

27
ing machine,
and by the end of the year the output of raw cotton
rose to 10,Uii9 bales, almost twice that of the previous year.

By

^^Phillips, American Negro Slavery, p. 1^1»
^^Scherer, op. cit., pp. 63, 66-67| Mo D. G. Grawford, The
Heritage of CottonCNew York, I92I4.), p. 11^.
^^Otraj, o£. cit., p. 1026.
^"^Qreen, op. cit., p. UIi.

the turn of the century production increased seven fold to 73,Ik?
bales.

And in the year of the Tallmadge amendment cotton output

rocketed to 3a9j005 bales, over thirty times the 1793 figure^

28

Of the total amount of cotton raised in the 1793-18l? period, a
majority of most of the yearly crops were exported.

To a consi

derable degree, Qreat Britain was its chief customer (with, of
„ , 29
course, a distinct lull during the War of lol2).
Running concurrently to this increase in cotton exports was
a gradual expansion in its domestic consumption.

Up to the turn of

the centuiy home use of the fiber constituted considerably less
than fifty per cent of the total production.

However, between IBOO

and 1819 national use generally made up about half of each year's
crop.

Several factors were responsible for this fact. Arnerica's

^®Other figures from Gray might serve to illustrate the almost
uninterrupted expansion of cotton production (all figures are given
in bales): 1791; - 16,719; 1795 - l6,719| 1796 » 20,899; 1797 « 22,939
1798 - 31,3U8| 1799 - 1^1,7975 I8OO - no figures; I8OI - 100,313; 1802
lllt,9U3j 1803 - 125,392; I80U - 135,81il; 1805 - lU6,290; I806 167,189; 1807 - 167,189; 1808 - l56,7liO; 1809 - 171,369; 1810 177,6381 1811 - 167,189; 1812 - l?6,7i|0; 1813 - l56,7ii0; 181I4 lli6,290j 1815 - 208,986; 1816 - 259,lii3; 1817 - 271,682; 1818 261,233.
29

Douglass C. North, The Economic Qrowth of the United States,
I79O-IB6O (Englewood Cliffs, 1961), p. 231^ Figures from the above
mentioned source illustrate the rapid growth in volume of cotton
exports (please note that these figures were originally in thousands
of pounds and had to therefore be converted to bales by dividing by
500 pounds - the average veight of a bale) s 1793 - 976; 179l|. - 320I4;
1795 - 12,552; 1796 - 12,2lli| 1797 - 7,576; 1798 ~ 18,720; 1799 19,061i| 1800 - 35,580; l801 - lil,822| l802 - 55,002; I803 - 82,212;
I80I; - 76,236; 1605 -80,/'66; 1806 - 7ii,982; I807 - 132,^26; I8O8 2U,128j 1809 - 106,U2O; 1810 - no figures; I8II - 12ii,372; l8l2 57,906; 1813 - 38,800; I81U - 35,612; 1815 - 165,998.

11
development of its owi textile ind-ustry led to a larger demand for
30
cotton.
growth.

Moreover, household manufactures exhibited a significant

"In the census of I8IO Southern States and Territories, not

including Maryland, Kentucky, and North Carolina, reported over
12,000,000 yards of cotton goods produced in households.
In addition to an expanding foreign demand and a growing
domestic textile production, another important incentive for the
short-staple cotton grower was the handsome price on the Hew Orleans
cotton exchange.

Prices fluctuated considerably from month to month,

yet for the period from l802 to 1819 short-staple cotton brought an
average price of more than eighteen cents a poundIn retrospect
one can see that this figure far surpassed the price for any compar
able span of years during the ante bellum erao^^
High market prices, foreign requests for more cotton, an
expanding domestic consumption, favorable growing conditions, improved
agricultural methods, and bountiful virgin lands in the Southwest »

^^Grray,

0£.

cit., pp. 695-696.

^^Ibid., p. 696.

staple
1801; 1808 1812 1816 -

^^Ibid,, p. 1027s Yearly average prices per pound for shortcotton at New Orleans weres I80? - lh.7 cts.j I8O3 - l5 cts.;
19.6 cta.jlSO^ - 23.3 cts. I 1806 - 21.8 cts.; I807 - l6.it cts. 5
13.6 cts.I 1809 - 13.6 cts.I 1810 - lit.7 cts.j 1811 - 8.9 cts.?
no figures; I813 - 15.5 cts.| I81I4 - 16„9 cts. 5 I8l5 - 27.3 cts.?
25.1 cts.I 1817 - 29.8 ctsoj 1818 - 21.5 cts.; 1819 - lli.3 cts.

33
Ibid! Representative figures for the other period were; 1828
- 9.8 cts.J 1833 - 11.2 cts.; 1838 - 124 ctsoi I81i3 - 7.5 cts.;l81i8 5.8 cts.I 1853 - 8.8 cts.I 1858 - 11»5 cts.j 1859 - 10.8 cts.; i860 11.1 cts.
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all of these factors emphasized a fuller utilization of the existing
slave labor forcei and it further accentuated the demand for more
slaves.

Thus, with the advent of the cotton gin, slavery was revital

ized as a profitable institution and the slave trade began a new
phase of reactivation,^^

Between 1790 and I8OO the estimated number

of slaves imported into the United States was 30,000j from I8OO to
1810 - 60,000j from I8IO to 1820 - ^0,000.

After I807 the illicit

slave traffic replaced the legally sanctioned trade, and for the
I808-I820 period it was approximated that 60,000 slaves were smuggled
into America. In addition to this enlargement in the slave population,
good treatment and encouragement of breeding helped further multiply
the Negro numbers.As the black throngs grew and the "King Cotton"
econon^r expanded, a subsequent transformation was taking place in
the minds of the Southern leadership.
In the quarter-century period prior to the Tallmadge amendment
one can see a picture of a prosperous Southern culture becoming in
creasingly dependent upon slavery as a means of economic livelihoods
Correspondingly, slave owners felt that the "peculiar institution"
was perhaps more permanent and economically sound than they had pre
viously thought.

Therefore, within the Southern mind a new attitude

toward slavery was developing. This frame of mind, which was closely
interwoven with economic considerations, was destined to play a signi-

3%ranklin,
gegce of a Natlonal~conongr, 1775-181$ (New York, 1962), pp. THH-T93T
^^Qray, op. cit., pp. 6U0-6^0.
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cant role in the congressional debates of the Missouri controversy.
Turning once again to political attitudes toward slavery,
it might be noted that the marriage of convenience or necessity
between the Democratic-Republicans and the slave interests had
certainly not been affirmed
party's leader.

any admiration of slavery hy the

Unmistakably Jefferson was against slavery, but

his party regarded slavery as a local issue which should be dealt
with locally.

Similarly, through their strict interpretation of

the Constitution, Jefferson and his followers believed in a broad
spectrum of states' rights.
On the other side of the political ledger, to some extent.
Federalists, most of whom were located in the Morth, differed from
their Democratic-Republican compatriots.

Generally, Federalists

could be seen in the ranks of wealthy merchants, well-to-do farmers,
bankers, factory owners (what few there were), and various profes
sional people.

Nevertheless, a number of Federalists could also be

found in the lower strata of society.

Regardless of their station

in life,party members were joined by certain fundamental beliefs.
Federalist doctrine was based upon a liberal interpretation
of the Constitution, an interpretation which promoted a strong cen
tral government.

Needless to say, this principle negated the states-

rights aspirations of the opposition.
were opposed to slavery.

Furthermore, most Federalists

Indeed, Federalist disdain toward the

issue intensified as slavery in the North decreased and as Federalist

^'^Eaton, o£. cit., pp. 1^8-159.

Ih
political power began ebbing.Perhaps this suggests that other
than humanitarian motivations were at work in the anti-slaveiy move
ment within the party.

This contravention of slavery became a

unifying force and a rallying cry for all party members.
Party leaders from both sides not only disagreed politically
but they also did not share the same opinion about the development
of the United States.

The party of Alexander Hamilton, George Wash

ington, and John Adams envisioned an industrial America, a nation of
cities and factories.

Jefferson, on the other hand, despised and

discounted any forecasts of an urban America.

He instead believed

that the America of the future would consist of endlesa small farms
with a tolerable minimum of cities.

Indeed, Jefferson equated urban

areas with dens of iniquity, and he regarded "the mobs of great
cities" as similar to sores on the human boc^.

Jefferson's view

was in accord with the tenor of the South and the Democratic-Repiiblican party.
Because of these mutual disagreements, both political and
economic, there was a degree of political balance between the free
North and the slave South.

An analysis of presidential elections

between 1789 and I8I6 indicates that the two political parties were
almost equal in strength. For the first three presidential terms
the Federalists were in power.

On the other hand, the Democratic-

^"^Franklin, o£. cit., pp. 176-1775 Francis Franklin, The Rise
of the American Nation, 1789-l82lt (New York, 19ii3), pp. 110-111.
^®Nettels, o£. cit., p. 127.

Republicans held the presidency

a substantial plurality in the

elections of iBOlj., I8O8, and I816. In 18OO and l8l2 the DemocraticRepublicans also captured the presidencjo
elections were relatively even.^^

However, both of these

On the eve of the Missouri con

troversy Federalist influence had waned.

The political balance of

power had been put in jeopar^ by a party which tended to favor a
states-rights philosopher analagous to the popular feelings of the

^^Thomas Hudson McKee, The National Conventions and Platforms
of all Political Parties, 1789-190^ (Baltimore, 1906), pp. 2-18. In
the 1789 electoral college vote the Federalists had overwhelming
control. Washington had 69, Adams 3h, and Jay 9, while a number of
other candidates had from six to one votes. In the 1792 vote the
Federalists elected Washington - 132, and Adams - 77j and the
Democratic-Republicans made some gains with Clinton - ^0, and
Jefferson - I4. In the 1796 electoral vote Federalist candidates,
Adams and Thomas Plnckney, received 71 and 59 votes j and the Demo
cratic-Republican candidates, Jefferson and Aaron Burr, received
59 and 30 votes. Adams became president and Jefferson was made
vice-president. In the election of I800 both Democratic-Republican
candidates, Jefferson and Burr, received 73 votes and the House
elected Jefferson as president and Burr as vice-president. In this
election the Federalists made a strong showing with Adams and
Pinckn^ polling 65 and 6k. In the election of iSOii the DemocraticRepublicans won 1:^ a landslide. Jefferson and Clinton won the pres
idency and vice-presidency ty the same 162 vote, Pinckn^ and
Rufus King each polled llj,. In the election of 1808 James Madison
and Clinton, the Democratic-Republican candidates, won 122 and 113.
Plnckney and King polled ^7 each. In the election of l8l2 the
Democratic-Republicans, Madison and ELbrldge Oerry won by 128 and
131. The Federalists with Clinton and Jared Ingersoll made a
relatively strong showing with 89 and 86. In the election of I816
James Monroe and Daniel Tompkins, Democratic-Republicans, won with
votes of 183. The Federalists, King and John E. Howard, received
votes of 3h and 22.

16
South.
The impending Missouri controversy proved a threat to both
sides of the political balance.

During the previous thirty years

both had lived amicably -with the problem of slavery, i.e., neither
side had done much to irritate the other. A survey of congressional
debates indicates that slavery and laws pertaining to slavery were
discussed only on rare occasions during this period.A status
quo situation was desired by both parties.

^Democratic-Republican power was much more pronounced in
the legislative branch. Almost from the very beginning the Demo
cratic-Republicans had a majority in one or both houses. These •
figures ^all bear out that point: First Congress: Senate - 26
Federalists, House - ^3 Federalists, 12 Democrats? Second Congress?
Senate - 17 Federalists, 13 Democrats, House Federalists, lit
Democrats? Third Congress; Senate - 18 Federalists, 12 Democrats,
House - 5l Federalists,
Democrats? Fourth Congress; Senate - 19
Federalists, 13 Democrats, House - ii6 Federalists,
Democrats?
Fifth Congress; Senate - 21 Federalists, 11 Democrats, House - 5l
Federalists,
Democrats? Sixth Congress; Senate - 19 Federalists,
13 Democrats, House - 57 Federalists, I48 Democrats? Seventh Con
gress; Senate - 13 Federalists, 19 Democrats, House - 3h Federalists,
71 Democrats? Eighth Congress; Senate - 10 Federalists, 2h Democrats,
House - 38 Federalists, IO3 Democrats? Ninth Congress; Senate - 7
Federalists, 27 Democrats, House - 29 Federalists, 112 Democrats?
Tenth Congress; Senate - 7 Federalists, 27 Democrats, House - 31
Federalists, 110 Democrats? Eleventh Congress; Senate - 10 Feder
alists, 2k Democrats, House - k6 Federalists, 9^ Democrats? Twelfth
Congress: Senate - 6 Federalists, 30 Democrats, House - 36 Federal
ists, 105 Democrats? Thirteenth Congress; Senate - 9 Federalists,
27 Democrats, House - 67 Federalists, 11^ Democrats? Fourteenth
Congress: Senate - 12 Federalists, 26 Democrats, House - 6l Federal
ists, 122 De-aacrats? Fifteenth Congress: Senate - 10 Federalists,
3h Democrats, House - 57 Federalists, 128 Democrats.
^^Jenkins, o£. cit., pp. U9-50.
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Bat it was inevitable that the status q-uo wonld be threatened
and eventually broken.

Slavery was too torrid a topic to lie tran

quil under a status quo.

This issue provided a fulcrum which anti-

slave CDngressmen used to menace the balance of power.

Indeed, it

can be said that the United States was never the same after the
Missouri controversy had run its course.

CHAPTER II

THE MISSOURI GONTROVERSI AND THE TALLMADOE AMENDMENT

On the eve of the Missouri contrcven^ the free states pos
sessed a substantial majoirity in the House while a delicate eleven
to ten balance in the upper house favored the anti-slave states.
This situation did not remain unchallenged for on December l8, iBlB,
Alabama and Missouri, t-wo slave territories, petitioned Congress for
permission to frame constitutions preparatory to their admission
into the Union. 2
Both states next proceeded to draw up constitutions which al
lowed slavery.

No serious objection was raised to Alabama's entrance

into the Union and on December lit, 1019, it achieved statehood.

The

admission of Alabama evened the number of senators from both sides of
the Mason-Dixon line. However, this status quo situation was threat
ened by Missouri and a series of long congressional debates arose.
One important and often misunderstood figure in this dispute was a

^Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North and South Carolina,
Georgia, Kentucl<y, Tennessee, Louisiana, and Mississippi made up
the ten slave states. The eleven free states included New York,
New Hampshire, New Jersey, Massachusetts, Rhode Island, Connecti
cut, Pennsylvania, Vermont, Ohio, Indiana and Illinois.
p
Annals of Congress, Fifteenth Congress, Second Session, I,
p. Iil8.
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freshman representative from New York, James Tallmadge, Junior.
Tallmadge was born on Jannaiy 20, 1778, in Stanford, Dutchess
County, New York.

The son of a Revolutionary War hero, Colonel

James Tallmadge, and a descendant of one of the earliest New England
families, James Tallmadge, Junior, graduated from Rhode Island Col
lege (now Brown University) in 1798.

During the next two years he

worked as the private secretary of the Democratic Governor of New
York, De Witt Clinton.

Following that politically enlightening ex

perience, Tallmadge studied law and was admitted to the New York bar
in l802.

He commenced his practice in Poughkeepsie, New York, and

soon became one of the state's most prominent and successful la-i^ers.
In addition to his professional pursuits, he was a gentleman farmer,
owning a sizable farm in Dutchess County.

At the beginning of the

War of l8l2 he was appointed brigadier general of the New York militia
and toward the end of the war he took charge of the defense of New
York City. After the war he continued his law practice and in 1817
he was elected to the House of Representatives.
Tallmadge's national political career proved to be both short
and significant.

Serving only one term (from June 6, 1817, to March

3, 1819), he made an unmistakable imprint on American history.'^

%iucien Carr, Missouri - A Bone of Contention (Boston, l89lj.)
p. 139.
^Dumas Malone, editor, Dictionary of American Biography (New
York, 1936), XTIII, pp. 285-286; Biographical Directo^ of the
American Congress, 177li-196l (Washington, 1961), p. 16o8THereafter
cited as Directory).
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On February 1^, l8l9, Tallraadge introduced an amendment to
a bill concerning the admission of Missouri as a state.

The bill

stated:
That the farther introduction of slavery or involuntary
servitude be prohibited, except for punishment of crimes,
whereof the party shall have been fully convicted; and that
all children born within the said State, after the admission
thereof into the Union, shall be free at the age of twentyfive years.5
The debate which followed thus entailed two questions?

(l)

Had Congress the right to designate conditions for a state government,
i.e., requirements other than a republican form of government| and
(2) would it be wise to exercise this power?
Although Tallraadge introduced the amendment, poor health pre
vented him from taking a truly active part in the discussion xfhinh
followed.

It was thus fortunate that John ¥. Taylor, a fellow col

league from New Tork, was able to carry the burden of the debate in
the early stages.

Taylor began by emphasizing the magnitude of a

congressional decision to extend slavery b^ond the Mississippi.
Continuing his oratory, he posed the question of whether or not con
gressional power was supreme over territorial governments.

The New

York representative answered affirmatively, citing Article four. Sec-

6

tion three of the Constitution

as proof of his reply.

Taylor went

on to say that slavery had been excluded by the new state constitutions

^Annals, og. cit., p. 1170.
^This section provides that "the Congress shall have the power
to dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States."
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of Ohio, Indiana, and Illinoisj and that since Missouri was in the
same latitude and had similar soil products and climate, it should
be treated likewise.

Continuing his attack, Taylor asserted moral,

humanitarian, and socio-economic reasons for his position.

The

Scriptures provided the primary basis for his admonishment of slavery
on moral grounds.

Closely akin to moral considerations was a strong

humanitarian concern for the disenfranchisement of the Negroes.
7
Taylor felt that "every citizen is entitled to equal rights."
More elaborate arguments were posed against slavery on the
socio-economic front.

It was argued "fcy Taylor that slavery in Mis

souri .rould stimulate the already illicit African slave trade.

More

over, he contended that acceptance of slavery in Missouri would
cause the state to become settled by rich planters whereas the ex
clusion of slavery would bring emigrants from the "poorer and labor-

8

ious classes of society."

Taylor next castigated the Southern

contention that a prohibition of slavery in Missouri would diminish
the price and sales of public land.

He made his point by comparing

land prdces of eqtiivalent holdings on both sides of the PennsylvaniaMaryland border.

He illustrated how slave-free Pennsylvanian acreage

sold for more than that of its southern neighbor.

Acting as a parti

san Northern politician of the first order, Taylor gave this frank
observation;

"^Annals, op. cit., p. 1177.
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Who has travelled along the line which divided that state
[Maryland^ from Pennsylvania, and has not observed that no
monuments are necessaiy to mark the boundary? that it is
easily traced "fcy following the dividing lines between highly
cultivated and plantations laying open to the coramon and
overnin with weeds| . . . between a neat, blooming, animated,
rosy-cheeked peasantry on one side, and a squalid, slowmotioned, black population on the other? Our vote this ds^
will determine which of these descriptions will hereafter
best suit the inhabitants of the new world b^ond the Mis
sissippi?
M.th those stirring words Taylor concluded his speech and yielded to
another Northerner.
Representative Timothy Fuller of Massachusetts sided with
Taylor*s constitutional argument and stated slavery was contrary to
this country's republican fonu of government.

The second paragraph

of the Declaration of Independence^*^ was quoted and from this he rea
soned that since slaves were "born free" in this country, they should
also be entitled to equal privileges.
The Massachusetts representative was then interrupted by sev
eral congressmen who felt it improper to question the republican form
of government of slaveholding states and their right to hold slaves
as property.

Fuller quickly asserted that he was not denying the

property rights of original slave states, i.e., slaveholding states
at the time the Constitution was promulgated, but rather that slavery
should not be planted in future states.

Moreover, he stated that the

^Ibid., p. 1178.
^%he second paragraph of the Declaration of Independence reads;
"¥e hold these truths to be self-evident - that all men are created
equal - that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
rights - that among these are life, liberty, and the pursuit of happi
ness."
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Constitution prohibited slave importation and exportation after I8O8
and any transporting of slaves across state lines "would be in viola
tion of that law.^^

With the termination of Fuller's speech the

12
North temporarily rested its case.
Puller's oration was particularly significant in that he used
the Declaration of Independence in defense of the Tallmadge amend
ment.

This was the first reference to the document during the

course of the l8l9 debate, and it gave rise to a variety of later
interpretations.

W.th the exception of a few remarks on the Declara

tion by Tallmadge, representatives preferred to cite other evidence.
However, as Phillip F. Detweiler notes in "Congressional Debate on
Slavery and the Declaration of Independence, 1819-1821," in the
Missouri debates of 1820 a more elaborate specter of opinions evolved.
He emphasizes that while some congressmen denied or discounted the
applicability of Jefferson's work to the question of slavery, a
number of congressmen from both sides of the Mason-Dixon line em13
ployed the document in support of their contentions.

Northerners

chiefly echoed the earlier remarks of Fuller, whereas their Southern
compatriots asserted that a restriction of slavery would be contrary
to the natural right of property

and the principle of national

^^Fuller admitted that Congress had not enforced this law but
that it possessed the power to do so.
^^Annals, op. cit., pp. 1178-ll8]b.
^^Phillip F. Detweiler, "Congressional Debate on Slavery and
the Declaration of Independence, I819-I821," American Historical
Review LXIII, Number 3 (April, 19^8), pp. 6oU'::ST^:
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sovereignty, namely the privilege of Missourians to form their own
government.

Detweiler closes his article by stating that the most

significant aspect of the controversy was that the Declaration had
been analyzed and utilized by both sides. In short, the Missouri
debates provided the first opportuniiy for slaveiy to be fully
considered in light of the Declaration.^^ Tet the arguments over
the relationship between the Delcaration and slavery only constitute
a minor portion of

the discussion of the Tallmadge amendment. More

over, although the North had effectively used the document on behalf
of its beliefs, the South was not without capable spokesmen or quick
rebuttals.
The South found its champion in Representative Phillip Pendle
ton Barbour of Virginia.

The Virginian began his oration

conceding

that the Constitution had granted Congress legislative power over
territories.

However, Barbour explained, sovereign states came under

different regulations.

Under the Constitution all powers not speci

fically granted to the national government belong to the states.
Thus, he reasoned, since the Constitution did not exclude slavery
from ar^ state, each state should decide the issue itself.
After lauding the treatment of Negroes in the South, Barbour
said that an expansion of slavery into the West would lessen the
likelihood of insurrections.

He made a nationalistic appeal for

Congress to realize that the only way that sectionalism could be

^^Ibid.
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alleviated woTild be by integrating the two ways of life, slaveholding
and free, west of the Mississippi. From nationalistic considerations
Barbour transferred his argument to economic thoughts.

He alleged

that a prohibition of slavery would decrease the number of prospec
tive buyers of western lands and this, in turn, would depress land
values.

Shrewdly Barbour inferred that Northern interests would

15
profit by purchasing this land at deflated prices.
Upon completion of the Virginian's speech. Representative
Arthur Livermore of New Hampshire rose to voice his feelings.

His

short oration was largely a reiteration of what previous Northerners
had said.

Livermore deplored the existence of slavery in America

and contended that it should be confined to its present area.

He

flatly denied that slavery was established by the Constitution»

Ter

minating his discourse, he made a plea for the prevention of the
1^
growth of "a sin which sits heavy on the soul of every one of us."-^
Tiftth the conclusion of debate, in the words of the Annals,
"The question being put on the motion of Mr, Tallmadge to amend the
17
bill, the vote was — for the amendment 79, against it 67."

After

the vote the House discussed other provisions of the Missouri bill
until the hour of adjournment.
On the following day, February 16, l8l9, the House convened

^^Annals, op. cit., pp. II8I4-II91.
^'^Ibid., p. 1193.
^"^Ibid.
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and continued the discussion.

John Scott, a delegate from Missouri,

was first to rise and voice his opinion.

Scott argued against the

amendment primarily on constitutional grounds.

He reiterated the

Southern contention that Congress had the power only to admit states
into the Union and that any restrictions imposed upon new states
would be contrary to Article four. Section three of the Constitution
which stated that:

"The citizens of each State shall be entitled to

all the privileges and immunities of citizens in the several states

18

Moreover, Scott declared that the three-fifths compromise provided
for the admission of slaveholding states (sic),^^

Therefore, he rea

soned, there should be no constitutional objection to further accep
tance of other slave states, and from this discussion Scott proceeded
to explain why slaveiy was disallowed northwest of the Ohio Rivero
According to the Ordinance of 1787> future slavery was prohibited in
the Northwest Territory. To Scott's way of thinking this was an
equitable provision because at that time few settlements existed in
the territory and slaveholding inhabitants who resided therein before
the signing of the Ordinance were permitted to keep forever their

^^Ibid., p. 1197.
19
^This was an erroneous supposition. Article one, Section two
of the Constitution (the federal ratio clause) states: "Representa
tives and direct taxes shall be apportioned among the several states
which may be included within this Union, according to their respect
ive Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number
of free Persons including those bound to Service for a Term of Tears,
and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons
No mention was made in the Constitution concerning the future admis
sion of slaveholding states=
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dark-skinned property, including future-born children.

Scott then

suggested that the Louisiana Territory's treaty of cession had guar
anteed Missouri speedy entry into the Union on an equal footing with

21
other states.

Thus Congress was duty-bound not only by the Consti

tution but also by treaty.

He next turned his attack upon Representa

tive Taylor.
Scott acknowledged that Taylor purported to be motivated by
humanitarian considerations. Yet the Missouri delegate suggested
that Taylor was also moved by "political views."

Scott did not

elaborate further on what he meant by "political views."

Moreover,

he criticized the notion that Missouri was too far north to admit
slavery.

He showed that part of Kentucky and the entire states of

Virginia and Maryland were above the northern boundaiy of Missourio
Scott closed his speech declaring that a restriction of slavery would
result in starvation for those Negroes "penfnedj up in the swamps and
morasses" of the South.

22

Tallmadge, who by his own admission was suffering from illness

20
The latter comment was an oblique criticism to the section
of Tallmadge's amendment which would grant freedom at age twentyfive to all children born after the amendment was enacted.
21

To prove his statement Scott quoted the third article of
the treaty: "The inhabitants of the ceded territoJT" shall be incor
porated in the Union of the United States, and admitted as soon as
possible, according to the principles of the Federal Constitution,
to the enjoyment of all the rights, advantages, and immunities of
citizens of the United States, and in the meantime, they shall be
maintained and protected in the free enjoyment of their liberty,
property, and the religion which they profess."

22
Annals, op. cit., p. 1202.
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and who had the day before returned from a long journey^ could re
train himself no longer and rose in defense of his amendment.

He

opened by sajring that he had hoped "to avoid any debate on the
present painful and unpleasant subject."

23

In reference to his

amendment he stated that its only purpose was to prohibit slavery
in territories across the Mississippi.

Furthermore, he mentioned

that he had prefaced his amendment with a statement that he had no
intention of intermingling in the affairs of any slaveholding states.
Moreover, he explained that he had not opposed the admission of Ala
bama because it was surrounded by slave states.

On the other hand,

he contended, Missouri was not in a similar condition and therefore
should be treated differently.

Tallmadge's remarks then took a

personal note.
The New Tork representative admonished the "harsh expressions"
and "unfriendly imputations" which had been leveled against him.
Thanking his friends for their support, he assured them that in
spite of the "violence" of his opponents he had not been nor would
he be driven from the debate.

He then quoted a statement which

Representative Thomas ¥. Cobb of Georgia had addressed directly to
him.

Cobb had said, "that if we persist, the Union will be dissolved;

we have kindled a fire which all the waters of the ocean cannot put
out, which seas of blood can only extinguish."

^^Ibid.. p. 1203.
^^Ibid.. p. 120U.

In perhaps the
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most poignant words of the debate Tallmadge retorteds
Sir, if a dissolution of the Union must take place, let
it be so! If civil war, which gentlemen so much threaten,
must come, I can only say, let it comeJ . . . If blood is
necessary to extinguish any fire which I have assisted to
kindle, I can assure, gentlemen, while I regret the necessity,
I shall not forebear to contribute my mite.^5
Further, he professed to be merely echoing the sentiments of his
constituents.
Proceeding to a different aspect of the discussion, Tallmadge
described the West as a land of limitless opportunities which could
be successfully exploited by hardy freemen.

Contrasted to this he

pictured an expanse cankered by "this abomination of heaven," a land
permeated by a weakness which would surely lead to the destruction
of the Union.
Turning to the Constitution, Tallmadge admitted that the
document had been notably silent about the terms under which new
states Bight be accepted into the Union.

However, he continued,

Article four. Section three, of the Constitution

27

inferred that

Congress could prescribe conditions under which new states might
seek admission into the Union.

Moreover, he suggested that Article

^^Ibid., pp. 120^-1206.
^"^This section states; "The Congress shall have power to
dispose of and make all needful rules and regulations respecting
the territory or other property belonging to the United States."
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one, Section ten of the Constitution

28

prohibited the importation

of slaves into any new states because those states were not specified
in that section.

Tallmadge then enumerated other conditions which

Congress had required for the admission of new states.
As Representative Taylor had done, Tallmadge mentioned that
the Ordinance of 1787 had specifically prohibited slavery in any new
states in the Northwest Territory.

Tallmadge castigated the Missouri

delegate's contention that Congress through the Louisiana Territory
treaty had allowed slavery within its bounds.
tive

The New York Representa

explained that since this treaty had guaranteed equal rights

and privileges to all inhabitants, slaves would become free upon
entering Missouri or any other part of the Louisiana Territory.

How

ever, continued Tallmadge, since the Senate had not the exclusive
power to endorse terras for the admission of new states, it was there
fore the right of both houses to decide accordingly.
Turning from the topic of congressional jurisdiction, he stated
that the introduction of slavery in the West would provide a greater
market for the illicit slave trade.

Concerning the allegation that

prohibition of slavery would retard the settlement of the West,
Tallmadge bluntly said that he would prefer an unsettled West to a
slave-ridden area.
Tallmadge mentioned that it was the duty of Congress to show

PR
^"Article one. Section ten specified that "the migration or
importation of such persons as any of the states now existing shall
think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior
to the year 1808. '•
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the "legitimates of Europe" (i.e., the ruling class) that America
would not extend slavery, an institution contraiy to the Declaration
of Independence, into the territories west of the Mississippi.

He

concluded that slaves were not justly treated by Southerners and it
29
was the House's duty to pass the measure.

After terminating the

debate, the House commenced voting on the first section of the
proposed amendment

30

which reads

"That the further introduction of

slavery or involuntaiy servitude be prohibited, except for the pun0"|
ishment of crimes, whereof the party shall have been duly convicted."-^
This provision was passed by an eighty-seven to seventy-six vote.
On the affimative side all votes, except for that of Representative
•Jfl-lliam Hall of Delaware, came from free states. On the other hand,
in addition to nearly unanimous Southern support, there were ten
32
free state representatives who voted against the bill.
Immediately after the first action another vote took place
on the latter half of the amendments

"And that all children born

^^Annals, op. cit., pp. 1206-1213.
3^0n February 15> 1819, the day that Tallmadge introduced his
amendment, the House agreed "ty a 79 to 6? vote to "the question being
put on the motion of Mr. Tallmadge to amend the bill." Since there
was more discussion and voting on the amendment, it would seem that
this was a vote to further consider the topic.
^^Annals, op. cit., p. 121I4.
^^Of these ten representatives three were from New York,
three from Massachusetts, one each from New Jers^, New Hampshire,
Ohio, and Illinois. In the case of the latter two border states,
Ohio "Representative Harrison was the only one of five Ohio repre
sentatives to vote negatively while McLean was the sole Illinois
representative.
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within the said State after the admission thereof into the Union,
shall be free at the age of twenty-five years.On this question
the yeas and nays were much closer, eighty-two voting for and
seventy-eight against.
tives

In this vote fourteen free-state representa

sided with the South and two New Tork delegates who had voted

affirmatively on the first measure abstained on the second. The
3^
South held its ground reasonably well with but one change in vote.
With the termination of that voting, the House by a ninetyseven to fifty-six majority ordered that the amendment "be engrossed
•jcf
for a third reading."
On the following day, February 17, l8l9,
the amendment was read and passed.
The Senate acted quickly on the Missouri bill and returned
the same measure to the lower house together with an amendment nega tingTallmadge's amendment.

On March 2, l8l9, the Senate bill was

introduced into the House, whereupon Tallmadge moved for indefinite
postponement.

This motion was discussed at length and turned down

by a vote of sixty-nine to seventy-four,

37

After the defeat of Tallmadge's motion, the House voted on

33Annal5, op« cit., p. 1215.
addition to the ten free state delegates who had voted
negatively on the first part of the amendment, four others. Repres
entatives Beocher and Campbell of Ohio, Linn of New Jersey, and
Mason of Rhode Island, took the same stand on the second section.
^^Annals, loc. cit.
^^Ibid., II, p. 1217.
37ibid.. p. 1U33.
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the Senate's bill.

By seventy-six yeas and seventy-nine nays the

lower house decided not to concur with the upper houseThat same
day the bill was returned to the Senate and again the upper house
refused to accept the Tallmadge amendments

Acting just as swiftlyj

the House by a seventy-eight to sixty-six vote decided to adhere to
39
its original position.

Despite congressional failure to reach an

agreement over the Tallmadge amendment, Missouri was granted permis
sion to frame a constitution preparatory to its admission into the
Union.

However, congressional discord over the amendment had, in

effect, cast a shadow upon Missouri's hopes for statehood.

It was

quite evident that Missouri would not be admitted until the slavery
question was settled.
Another chapter in Missouri's struggle for statehood opened
when on December 8, 1819, John Scott, the Missouri delegate, intro
duced

in the House a memorial of the Territorial Legislature reques-

tj.ng statehood.

The bill was reported to a conanittee of five headed

by Scott and the following day it was submitted to the House floor
where it was discussed for the duration of the month.

During this

same period the Maine statehood bill was initiated and Speaker of the
House Heniy Clay suggested the two statehood bills be joined, but no
immediate action was taken on his motion.

^^Ibid., p. lli3U.
^^Tbid., pp. Ili35, lli38.

On Januaiy 3, 1820, the

3h
Maine bill passed the lower house and was sent to the upper houseo^^
The Senate had already received the Missouri memorial and
had forwarded it to the Judiciary Committee which was also consider
ing the Maine bill.

After deliberating the two bills, the committee

sent to the floor the Maine bill, with the Missouri bill added as an
amendment.

The Ssnate tried to separate the two but this effort
1

"1

failed by a vote of twenty-five to eighteen.

On January 17, l820,

two anti-slavery amendments to the statehood bills were introduced
in the upper house.

The first, submitted by Senator Ninian Edwards

of Illinois, wsuld exclude slavery from any United States territory.
Ii2

This amendment, however, was soon withdrawn.

The second, written

by Senator Jonathan Roberts of Pennsylvania, was similar to the first
I
section of Tallmadge's amendment.
As one might expect, Robert's provision was hotly debated and
eventually was defeated.On the following day Senator Jesse B.
Thomas of Illinois introduced a bill which would prohibit slavery in
all United States territory north and west of Missouri, with the line

^'^Annals of Congress, Sixteenth Congress, First Session, I,
p. SUB.
^^Ibid., p. 118.
^^Ibid.. p. 119.
^^Hobert's amendment read; "Provided, that the further intro
duction into said State of persons to be held to slavery or involun
tary servitude within the same, shall be absolutely and irrevocably
prohibited."
uu
Annals, op. cit., p. 359.
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of demarcation being latitude thiriy-six degrees, thirly minutes.
For the remainder of January, and well into Februaiy, the bill was
discussed and later attached as an amendment to the Missouri bill.
On February 18, 1820, the Maine-Missouri bill, together with the
Thomas amendment, was passed.

ii5

Meanwhile, the House was also considering the Missouri ques
tion.

The Senate's Maine-Missouri bill was taken up and on January

23, 1820, the lower house voted to reject the upper house's notion
that the two statehood bills should be joined.

The House then, on

March 1, 1820, passed and sent a separate Missouri bill, together
with a slavery restriction amendment, back to the upper house.

Upon

receiving the House's bill, the Senate deleted the slaveiy restric
tion clause and in its place substituted the Thomas amendment.

A

final solution to the problem was proposed by a joint committee which
recommended: (l) that the two bills be passed separatelyj (2) that
the House's slavery restriction amendment be negatedj and (3) that
the Thomas amendment be made part of the Missouri bill.
concurred with the three suggestions.^^

Both houses

Thus another, but not final,

phase in the Missouri odyssey toward statehood had ended.
During 1820 Missouri prepared for statehood ty drafting a
constitution, electing state and local officials, and organizing a
state government.

But certain Northern statesmen and their consti-

^^Ibid., p. ii30.
^%id., pp. 1586-1587.
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tuents sought to dels^, if not defeat, the admission of Missouri
into the Union.According to Floyd Calvin Shoemaker, a prondnent
Missouri historian. Eastern newspapers advocated the same exclusion
policy.^®

Thus, in view of the concerted opposition, it was no sur

prise that Missouri Senators David Barton and Thomas Benton and
Representative Scott were refused seats in Congress on November l6,

1820. The opposition alleged that the new Congressmen could not be
li9
seated until the 1820 constitution was accepted by Congress.
For the duration of the year and into 1821 Congress once
again debated the Missouri question.

As before, the Senate favored

admission while the Ifouse diaspproved, the chief bone of contention
being a clause in the new state's constitution which would bar free
Negroes and raulattoes from settling in the state,,^^

After a great

^^In his Slavery in Missouri, I80i4-l86^, Harrison Anthony
Trexler (a former assistant professor of economic history at Montana
State University) notes that authorities on the topic believed that
these Northern attacks caused a change in the attitude of the Mis
souri public toward slavery. According to this orthodox line,
Northern hostility "pricked her [Missouri's} pride" and thus induced
her into an ardently pro-slavery position. Trexler disputes this
notion by stating that: "The people of Missouri were in favor of
slavery from the earliest days of its existence as a Territory."
Harrison Anthony Trexler, Slavery in Missouri, l80lj-l865 (Baltimore,
1911i), p. ICQ.
iiS
Floyd Calvin Shoemaker, Missouri's Struggle for Statehood,
I80U-I821 (Jefferson City, 1916), p. 290.
^^Ibid., pp. 290-291.
^%rank Heywood Hodder stated that? "The Missouri constitu
tion was enacted without being referred to a popular vote." Frank
Heywood Hodder, "Side Lights on the Missouri Compromises," Annual
Report of the American Historical Association for the Year 1909
(Washington, 1911), p. 1^7.
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deal of debate and a number of negative votes by the House, a joint
committee, -with Speaker of the House Henry Clay as chairman, was
selected to

decide the issue.

On February 26, 1821, the committee reported with what was
later to be called the Second Missouri Compromisec

A proviso, which

was written by Clay, asserted that citizens of other states settling
in Missouri should enjoy "the privileges and immunities to which such
nf-i
citizen is entitled under the Constitution of the United States.""^
The House adopted the report the same day and the Senate approved it
on February 28, l821.

President James Monroe signed the measure on

n
52
March 2, 1021.

^^The full report of which this was only a part reads ^'Resolved,
the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
States of America in Congress assembled,, That Missouri shall be
admitted into this Union on an equal footing with the original
States in all respects whatever, upon the fundamental condition,
that the fourth clause of the twenty-sixth section of the third
article of the constitution subndtted on the part of said State to
Congress shall never be construed to authorize the passage of any
law, and that no law shall be passed in conformity thereto, by
which any citizen of either of the States in this Union shall be
excluded from the enjoyment of any of the privileges and imnranities
to which such citizen is entitled under the Constitution of the
United States: Provided, that the Legislature of the said State,
by a solemn public act, shall declare the assent of the said State
to the said fundamental condition, and shall transmit to the Presi
dent of the United States, on or before the fourth Monday in
November next, an authentic copy of the said act| upon receipt
whereof the President, by proclamation, shall announce the fact;
whereupon, and without any further proceeding on the part of Con
gress, the admission of the said state into this Union, shall be
considered as complete."

<2

Shoemaker, 0£. cit., p. 300„
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Wthout doubt the Missouri controTersy was an opening chapter
to a series of sectional antagonisms which culminated in the War
between the States.

Equally without doubt James Tallmadge played

an instrumental role in promoting disagreements between the two
sides.

Strangely enough, though, he bowed out of national politics

shortly after introducing his famous amendment.

Although Tallmadge

has been best remembered for his fight against slaveiy, he had also
distinguished himself by vigorously defending General Andrew Jackson's
conduct during the Seminole campaign of l8l9.

His term of office

expired March 3j l8l9, and for some unexplained reason he declined
renomination, choosing instead to run as a Clintonian candidate for
the New Tork Senate.
During the course of his campaign for the New York Senate,
the Missouri question was an issue and one argument on behalf of
Tallmadge was that he had "dared to oppose the aristocratical southern
influence."

His stand brought support from the Negroes, Quakers,

and Manumission Society, but their votes were not enough and he was
defeated by the Tanmany candidate.

Shortly thereafter he broke with

De WLtt Clinton and joined the Tammany or Bucktail wing of the New

^^Glover Moore, The Missouri Controversy, 1819-1821 (Lexing
ton, 1953), p. 36; Malone, op. cit.", pp. 2ti^-2o6.
^^Moore, loc. cit.
^^According to Moore, Tallmadge felt that he had embittered
Clinton ty supporting the Monroe administration in the debate on
the Seminole War. Furthermore, Tallmadge had hard feelings because
Clinton had not earlier rewarded him with an appointive office.

39
York Democratic party,After his defeat he retired to private life,
spending his summer months at his Dutchess County estate and his
winters in New Tork City.^"^
Two years later he returned to the political front as a dele
gate to the New Tork constitutional convention.
elected to the State Assembly.

In l82ii he was

The following year he lost out in

his attempt to receive his party's nomination as governor.

However,

as a consolation he was unanimously nominated lieutenant governoro
Tallmadge was elected to that office and served one two-year term^
c'8
This was his last tenure in an elective political positiono"^
For the ranainder of his life Tallmadge was occupied with
non-political activities.

He helped found the University of the

City of New Tork (now New Tork University) and was its president
from I83U to 18)46.^^

He also originated the New Tork City American

Institute which was devoted to the promotion of useful arts. From
IB3I to 18^0 he acted as president of the institute.At the age
of seventy-five, after a life of conspicuous public service, James
6"'

Tallmadge, Junior, died in New Tork City on September 29, 18^3.^^

^%oore, op. cit., p. 38»
^"^Malone, loc. cit., pp. 285-286.
^®Jabez D, Hammond, The History of Political Parties in the
State of New Tork (Cooperstown, Ibitit), II, pp.. 172-173.
^%alone, loc. cit.
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National Cyclopaedia of American Biograpltir (New Tork, I893),
in, p. kW.
•
Directory, loc. cit.
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Tallmadge•s legacy of achieirements has certainly been signi
ficant in American history, but no accomplishment has brought more
discussion and controversy than his amendment to the Missouri state
hood bill.

Its consequences are well known to all students of Amer

ican history but there have been uncertainties regarding the author's
reason or reasons for introducing the amendment. "While many historians
have not ventured an opinion concerning the New Yorker's motives^
others have developed historiographical analyses of the interesting
problem.
Perhaps the first historian to coiament was James Schouler who
in his multi-volume work stated that Tallmadge was motivated by
"deep conviction.The author, however, neglected to explain
what he meant by ^ihose two words.

Nevertheless, one could probably

assume that he was referring to a fervent humanitarian anti-slavery
conviction.
Several years later another historian, Lucien Carr, suggested
that ostensibly the amendment was introduced for moral-humanitarian
reasons.

However, he asserted that the underlying rationale was

political, i.e.. Northerners such as Tallmadge and Rufus King were
^-3
attempting to check the aggrandizement of Southern political power.
According to the opinion of Homer Car^ Hockett, Tallmadge's
amendment was the beginning of an effort on the part of Northern

62jaraes Schouler, History of the United States of America,
revised edition (New Tork, lBa5),"Tll5 p. 103,
^^Garr, o£. cit., p. 139.

lil
leaders to prevent the spread of the "moral and political evils" of
the Southern institution.^^

Similarly, Ulrich Bonnell Phillips'

work. The Course of the South to Secession, told of a concerted
Northern effort to check the South's political expansion.

Moreover,

Phillips recognized a North-South conflict regarding the protective
tariff which the North preferred.

In light of this background the

author regarded the amendment as a drive to stem the South's political
65
and economic power.
Within five years of Phillip's book two other historians added
their contributions to the historiographical problem.

Still follow

ing an economic interpretation, Qlyndon ?an Deusen explained that
Northern "moral animosity" toward slavery (of which Tallmadge was a
spokesman) manifested itself only after the "peculiar institution"
became unprofitable above the Mason-Dixon line„

Francis Franklin

likewise gave an economic interpretation, but he expressed himself
in a different manner.

According to him, Tallmadge, together with

other Northern and Western capitalists, sought to prohibit the growth
of slavery west of the Mississippi,

presumably so they themselves

Homer Carey Hockett, Political and Social Growth of the
United States. Ili92-l852 (New for!c7T:^3Trp'7W7
6%lrich Bonnell Phillips, The Course of the South to Secession (New York, 1939), p. 9566QXyndon Oarlock ?an Deusen, The Life of Henry Clay (Boston,
1937), p. 135.
^'^Francis Franklin, op. cit., pp 2U8-2li9.
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could develop that section of the nation.

In the late 19li.0's two Southern historians added their opin
ions to the discussion.

The first of these scholars, Charles S„

Sydnor, made a positive, unqualified assertion that the representa
tive from Dutchess County had been "moved solely by humanitarian
69
considerations."

One year after the publication of Sydnor's work,

Clement Eaton discounted humanitarian motives stating that Tallmadge
was pressed by the political intention of preventing the growth of
70
Southern congressional representation.
In the next decade two more historians made their contribu
tions to the academic discussion.

In a scholarly work. The Era of

Gtood Feelings, George Dangerfield frankly admitted that "nothing
is known" about the reason or reasons for Tallmadge's amendment„
The author illustrated how the New Yorker perplexed his contempo
raries by changing his political alignment on several occasions.

As

a close to his evaluation, however, Dangerfield commented that Tall
madge may have introduced his amendment "because he abominated
slavery.

^®The latter statement was not directly made by Franklin. It
was therefore an assumption that the writer makes from the context
of Franklin's writing.
^^Charles S. Sydnor, ojp. cit., p. 12?.
'^'^ton,

"^^Qeorge Dangerfield, The Era of Qood Feelings (New York,
19^2), pp. 199-200.

U3
Perhaps the most penetrating analysis of Tallraadge was made
by Qlover Moore in his lucidly-written and detailed book. The Missouri
Controversy, l8l9-l821.

Like Dangerfield, Moore acknowledges the

difficulty in making a judgment of Tallmadge's motives.

The author

admits that the New York representative was a complex individual,
both politically and personally.

After an interesting survey of

Tallraadge's background, Moore stated that the New Yorker "seems to
have been motivated primarily by humanitarian and patriotic consid72
erations."

However, the author does not stop his disciission at

that juncture.

As a secondary motive he suggested that long estab

lished Glintonian anti-South feelings also moved Tallmadge to his
stand against slavery.
A recent volume by Dwight Lowell Dumond assertss

"Tallmadge

was a man of broad humanitarian principles, strongly opposed to
slavery and his action was in the liberal tradition of those who
had abolished slavery in New York state,

This coinraent is poE-

sibly the most current addition to the ever-growing historiography
of the motives behind the Tallmadge amendment.
In concluding a survey of Tallmadge's motivation it might be
noted that three interpretations — humanitarian, political, and
economic — were brought to light.

Of the three, the humanitarian

"^^oore, op. cit., p. 38.
"^^bid., p. 39.
"^^Dwight Lowell Dumond, Antislaveiy - The Crusade for Freedom
in America (Ann Arbor, I961), p. 102.
——~
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motive seems to have been the most popular explanation of the historiographical problem.

Van Deusen, Sydnor, Moore, and Duraond

recognized this as being Tallmadge's primary consideration»

In

less specific terms Schouler and Dangerfield also followed that
line of reasoning.

Hockett would at least fall partly in this

category since he listed both moral and political reasons behind
the initiation of the amendment.
While Hockett and Moore felt that Tallmadge was partially
moved by political considerations,

Garr, Phillips, and Eaton as

serted that the New York representative was chiefly influenced by
political motives.

Moreover, Phillips, ?an Deusen, and, in less

specific terms. Franklin maintained that Tallmadge was motivated
in part by economic considerations.
After reviewing secondary accounts of Tallmadge and his
amendment, it seems quite evident that historians writing on this
topic have been laboring under less than desirable circumstances,
Tallmadge's true motivation remains largely a nystery because there
is no evidence that he left either a diary, autobiography, or other
personal papers.

This scarcity of material has perhaps led to a

greater variety of interpretations of the problem.

Nevertheless,

in spite of somewhat insufficient information, one cannot but be
lieve that Tallmadge was probably moved by many considerations humanitarian, political, and economic.
In view of the fact that Tallmadge never attempted to achieve
any significant political gains through his amendment, and since he

evidently did not receive any noticeable economic rewards or bene
fits through his amendment, one might conclude that he was primarily
motivated by his humanitarian sentiments.

CMPTER III

THE EVIDENCE OF THE AMMS PAPERS

A. THE QUESTION OF PERSONAL AND SECTIONAL MOTIVATIONS

Investigation of the background, congressional debates, and
secondary reports of the Missouri controversy unveils an interesting,
but incomplete, picture of Tallmadge's motivation and the even
broader problem of the reasons behind the dispute.

Fortunately,

the Adams Papers provide a penetrating insight into the topic.

For

example. Secretary of State John Quincy Adams believed that the
Speaker of the House, Henry Clay (of Kentucky), and Secretary of the
•Treasury, Iflailiara H. Gra-wford (of Georgia), were xising the contro
versy as a vehicle to perpetuate the do-wnfall of the Monroe admin
istration.

In his diaiy entry for Februaiy 20, 1820, Adams foresaw

this move as part of a Clay-Crawford drive to form a new party

1
which would realize the presidential aspirations of one of them.
According to the Secretary of State, these opponents of the admin
istration had embarked upon a divide-and-conquer campaign within
the executive, i.e., through splitting the cabinet into factions
and creating distrust and resentment among its members, the

^Diary of John Quincy Adams, February 20, 1820, Adams Papers
microfilm (Hereafter cited as Diary)„
li6
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administration would be weakened to such an extent that it could
not win in any future election.
This strategy was aptly described in Adams' memoirs. In the
latter part of 1819, the year that the Tallmadge amendment had been
struck down, Adams observeds

"The enemies of Monroe's Administra

tion and D^y enemies have been continually laboring with the industry
and venom of spiders to excite in his mind a jealousy of me.

They

p
have so far succeeded that whatever I recommend he distrusts."

Earlier that year Adams had been warned about Clay's ambitions.
During the first Missouri debate Henry Middleton,^ a Southern
friend of Adams, informed the Secretary that Clay had been using
the controversy as a means of advancing his own political aspira
tions.

According to Middleton, the Speaker of the House had estab

lished himself as "the champion of the Southern interest" in order
that he might assume leadership of their party and ride into the
1820 presidential elections on the crest of his popularity.

Adams

also observed that Crawford was actively courting Southern interests
by espousing his belief that slavery should not be restricted in

^Charles Francis Acjams, editor, Memoirs of John Qulncy Adams
(Philadelphia, 10714-1877), IV, p.
(Hereafter cited as Memoirs}.
%iddleton had been the former governor of South Carolina
(1BIO-I812) and a member of the House of Representatives from l8l5
to 1819. He was an unsuccessful candidate for renomination in I8I8.
On April 6, 1820, he assumed the appointment as Minister to Russia.
He held this post for ten years.
^Diaiy, op. clt., February I6, l8l9.
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any section of the Union.
While Tie"wing the Clay-Crawford tnaneuver, the Secretary of
State regarded the debate as simply being a dispute between slave
holders and non-slaveholders.

Moreover^ he ardently disapproved of

the over-heated agitation -which Southerners exhibited.

He recognized

the Southerners as being blustering, violent, and unreasonable in
their defense while Northern congressmen were quiet and sensible in

6
presenting their position.
Though the Secretaiy of State mentioned that personal ambi
tions were involved in the issue, he also envisioned the contest as
a struggle for power between the states of Virginia and New York.,
Adams felt that the controversy was being utilized as an opportunity
to topple the "Virginia Dynasty" which had heretofore played a key
role in national

politics.'^

Moreover, Adams reported that many

Southerners regarded the Tallraadge amendment as a deliberate effort
to stifle Southern power.

Adams believed that the Southern slave

holders possessed a disproportionately large amount of political
influence.

He accredited this phenomena to several factors.

First,

the slaveholders had an overly abundant supply of competent spokes
men in Congress.

In the House there were no equals to the rhetorical

^As a matter of fact, in a January 19, 1819, letter to John
Quincy Adams, Jonathan Jennings, the governor of Indiana, stated
that Crawford, together with others, was promoting the adoption of
an Indiana legislative measure which would allow slavery.
"^Diaiy, op. cit., July

I8l9.

"^Ibid., January 20, 1820. .
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talents of John Randolph (of Virginia) and Henry Clay,

And in the

Senate Rufus King (of New York) had a difficult task in staving
off the verbal onslaughts of men like James Barbour (of Virginia)
and M.lliam Pinkn^ (of South Carolina)«

Secondly, Southern con

gressmen were more vehement in their defense of slavery because
their own personal and selfish interests were at stake.

Lastly,

the free states were rent by dissension within their ranks.

A

nmber of Northerners had chosen to side with the slave men for a
variety of reasons.

The sum total of these factors resulted in a

political balance of power which, according to Adams, tended to

8

favor the South.

Commenting later on the defeat of the slavery restriction,
Adams observed that selfish slaveholding elements had vanquished
the free state members who possessed a majority in both houses,
Adams reasoned that since Southern congressmen were all slaveholders
and since almost all of their constituents also owned slaves (slc),^
th^ would naturally oppose any threat to their political and eco
nomic status.

On the other side of the controversy the Secretary

felt that the free state representatives were moved by republican
principles and humanitarian motives.

However, in a partial rebuttal

to this former comment, Adgms recognized political and sectional

^Ibid., January 10, 1820.
9
"^In his The Last of the Cocked Hats? James Monroe and The
Virginia Qynasty, Arthur'^iyron writess "Only about ^ per cent of
the South's population owned more than three slaves, and this small
percentage never had the power to force its predilections upon the
rest of the people."

^0
interests as being equally operative on both sides.

But in closing

his remarks he again referred to the issue as a struggle between
10
self-interested elements and those on the side of humanitarian!sm.
Probably no person was more prominent in the Missouri question
than Henry Cl^.
dispute.

Adams observed that Clay played a dual role in the

On one hand, the Speaker helped keep the Missouri pot boil

ing so that he could receive publicity and renown as the spokesman
of the South.On the other hand, after the issue began threaten
ing a dissolution of the Union, Clay did his part in effecting a

12 Although Adams did not state that Clay promoted the

compromise.

Missouri Compromise in order to set aside a dangerous political issue,
i.e., dangerous because it could promote a dissolution of the Union^
he may have subtly inferred that Clay was moved by political consider
ations.

This conclusion is easy to assume if one folloira Adams' logic,

namely, that Clay was motivated his Ms own selfish interests.,

More

over, since there were several mentions of a Clay-Clinton^^ or Clay-

^ODia:cy, March 7, 1820.
^^his statement was originally ascribed to Middleton (see
pages U7 and U8). However, Adams accepted it as valid and incorpora
ted it into his own views.
^%emoir3, V, o£. cit., p. 53 =
^^The Clinton referred to here is De Ifitt Clinton. He is not
only famous for his promotion of the building of the Erie Canal but
also for his active political interests-. He served in both houses
of the New York legislature, as mayor of New York Cily, a United
States Senator, and lieutenant governor of New York. At the time
of the Missouri controversy he was governor of New York. He was an
unsuccessful Federalist presidential candidate in the election of

1812.
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Clinton-Crawford coalition against the administration,^^ it would
seem more expedient for Clay to dispose of the Missouri question
rather than risk a break with his Northern ally over the slavery
issue.
There is in Adams' writings some mention of De W.tt Clinton
taking a behind-the-scene role in the Missouri controversy. Accord
ing to John ¥. Taylor, some Southerners believed that Clinton was
the true author of the Tallraadge amendment.

However, Taylor derided

that rumor by stating that Clinton had only taken an interest in
1^
the dispute after he found it politically profitable in his state.
Clay, like Clinton, was first and foremost a politician and
in his diary Adams assailed him repeatedly for opportunism.
thought that Clay was his chief political adversaiy.
had won the only cabinet post which Clay desired.

Adams

The Secretaiy

Likewise, the

Speaker regarded Adams as one of his foremost opponents in any
future presidential contest.

Adams was fully aware of Clay's

sentiments but he preferred not to publicly oppose him or air his
own views on the Missouri question.

Nevertheless, he felt that

the time might come when he would be called upon to voice his
opinion.

^^Memoirs, 17, o£. cit., p. 2U3j V, p. 31^.
^^Ibid., p. 203.
^^Ibid.. pp. 90-91
^"^Ibid., IV, p. 502.
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In the course of Adams' commentary on the Missouri controversy
a vivid analysis evolves of Clay as a person, politician, and future
president.

Despite his many condemnations of the Speaker, Adams

could not but admire Clay's ability.

But, in a typically puritanical

fashion, he disapproved of the Speaker's moral standards.
subject he wrote:

On this

"In politics, as in private life, Clay is essen

tially a gamester, and, with a vigorous intellect, an ardent spirit,
a handsome elocution, though with a mind very defective in elementary
knowledge, and a very undigested system of ethics, he has all the
qualities which belong to that class of human characters."^®

After

Clay had chosen to retire from politics in order to revamp his per
sonal finances, Adams speculated upon what kind of president the
Kentuckian would make.

The Secretary conceived that Clay's adminis

tration would result in numerous internal improvements, but that his
presidency "would be sectional in its spirit and sacrifice all other
interests to those of the Western country and the slaveholders."^^
Wdle Clay's part in the Missouri controversy was regarded
as selfish and sectional, the North's most ardent spokesman, Rufus
King (of New York) was seen by Adams as a true humanitarian whose
only motives were pure and just.

Adams believed that King was re

ceiving vigorous encouragement from his friends.

Moreover, the

Secretary observed that the Hew Yorker was overestimating his future

^^Allan Nevins, editor. The Diary of John Quincy Adams, 179ii18]|5 (New York, 1928), p. 293^^Ibid., p. 263.
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anti-slavery support.

According to Adams, King felt that the slaveiy

question would continue to stimulate strong Northern ardor for his
anti-slaveiy policy.

Adams, on the other hand, asserted that after

the compromise was reached. Northerners would soon forget about the
dispute because it did not directly affect them either personally or
20
economically.

Concerning accusations that personal aggrandizement

was motivating King, Adams conceded that all politicians are moved by
selfish as well as public considerations. Yet, the Secretary de-

21

dared that King was driven by humanitarianism.

Likewise, his high

regard for King's integrity can be witnessed in repeated passages
throughout

his diary.

In surveying Adams' diary for the 1819-1821 period it seems
evident that New Yorkers — T^lor and Tallmadge in the House and
King in the Senate — took the lead in promoting a restriction of
slavery.

This New York leadership might be regarded as either coin

cidental or deliberately devised.

The Adams Papers shed some light

upon this question. While John Quincy Adams ascribed nothing more
than humanitarian motives to King's actions, there was one reference
made to a Southern accusation that the conflict was perpetuated by
New York's governor, De Ti^Ltt Clinton, in the hope of forming a new
political party.

pp

Thus, as the allegation suggested, Clinton was

^%emoir3, IV", 0£. cit., p. 533.
o£. cit., March k, 1820.
^%emoirs, V, o£. cit., p. 203.

the trae originator of the Tallmadge amendment and the three New
York congressmen merely carried out his wisheso

According to the

Adams lepers, there is no substantiation of this idea on the part of
23
either King or Tallmadge j but there is some evidence that Taylor
may have been involved with Clinton«
John Quincy Adams noted that Taylor had disavowed any proClintonian connections before he was chosen Speaker of the House
for the 1821 session.Yet, continued Adams, Taylor had openly
accepted Clintonian support in his 1820 re-election.

The Secretary

further reported that John C. Calhoun, the Secretaiy of War, thought
that Taylor was in league with Clay and Crawford against the admin
istration.

Trior's anti-administration attitude was further wit

nessed by his appointment of committee chairmen who, to paraphrase
Calhoun, did not act in accord with the executive.

2?

In view of Taylor's apparent political opportunism in 1020,
one might also assume that perhaps his efforts in the Missouri de
bates were motivated by other than humanitarian reasons.

His liaison

^%he Adams F^pers make veiy scant reference to Tallmadge.
John Quincy Adams was the only person who mentioned the Hew York
representative and his comments related to Tallmadge's role in the
Seminole War debates and the fact that he had introduced an amend
ment which would prohibit slavery in Missouri. Adams conversed
several times with Tallmadge but unfortunately he did not elaborate
in any of his writings.
^^On November 1^, 1820, John ¥. Taylor was elected as Speaker.
His election came on the twenty-third ballot, only after he had
promised that he was not a partisan of De In/itt Clinton.
^^Diaiy, op. cit., November 29, 1821.
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with Clinton in 1820 was undotibtedly necessary for his re-election,
but it -would seem that in accepting the governor's support he was
also obligating himself to return the favoro
The actions of Clinton induce some additional speculationso
While it might be true that Clinton fostered the Missouri controversy
in order to form a new Northern political party, it would seem more
likely that he would not desire to formulate such a move. It would
seem more politically advantageous to unite with Clay and Crawford
against the administration.

Such a union would join all sections of tfie

country — North, South, and West ~ since all three men represented
different parts of the United States.

In retrospect, though, if any

such political maneuvers were taking place at that time, th^ cer
tainly were not successful because Monroe won by a landslide in the
1820 presidential election.
Whether or not the speculations about Clinton are valid, one
cannot but notice that John Quincy Adams accredited a large portion
of the controversy to personal and sectional motives of Southernerso
He regarded the dispute as a contest between right and wrongj and,
of course, the cause of slavery was viewed as totally incompatible
with ar^r of his principles.

One can thus conclude that Adams was

bigoted in his attitude and failed to recognize the problem from the
standpoint of the South. Nevertheless, in spite of his over-simpli
fications and intolerance, valuable insights can be derived from his
writings.
An interesting counterpoint to the evidence of the Adana Papers
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can be found in the comments of Senator Charles fait of Georgia.
Tait saw the Tallmadge amendment as a Northern attempt to gain
political control.

He thought that Rufus King rather than James

Tallmadge was the instigator of the controversy, and that King had,
in the words of Tait, "raised this tempest merely to ride into
27
power." '

Unlike either of the Adamses, the Georgia senator pic

tured King as a "plausible, insidious, and insincere politician"
who was in league with De W-tt Clinton in an effort to exalt himself
politically.

Unable to see ai^ of the admirable humanitarian qual

ities of which the Adamses had spoken, Tait noteds "All that wicked
28
ambition can suggest he is capable of."
In 1820, after having
stepped down from the Senate, he observed that the Missouri question

'^"Charles Tait was born in Hanover, Virginia, on February 1,
1768. In 1783 he moved to Wilkes County, Georgia, where he attended
MLlkes Acadeitgr. After graduating from Ccikesburg College (Avingdon,
Maryland) in 1789, he served as professor of French at his alma
mater until 179ij.. In 1795 he was admitted to the bar and from 1795
to 1798 he held a law professorship at Hichmond Acadei^ in Augusta,
Georgia. From I803 to l809 he acted as presiding judge of the
western circuit court of Georgia. In I809 he was elected to fill
out the unexpired term of Senator John Milledge of Georgia, Tait
was re-elected in I813 and served until March 3» 1819. At the time
of the introduction of the Tallmadge amendment he presided as Chair
man of the committee which reviewed the New Yorker's amendment.
IBLs committee struck down the amendment,,
2'^Charles H. Moffatt, "Charles Tait, Planter, Politician, and
Scientist of the Old South," The Journal of Southern Rlstoiy XI?
(Februaiy-Novffliiber, 19it8), pp. 219-220„
^®Ibid.
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had grown into more than a political dispute.

He regarded it as a

serious national problem which, if not resolved, would result in
the formation of a confederacy of slaveholding states»

Like mai^

other Northern and Southern politicians, Tait recognized the need
for cool heads and compromise,

Although Tait and the Adamses

differed on their assessment of King's motivation, all agreed that
compromise would be the only solution to the Missouri controversyo

B.

THE LONQ-MNQE EFFECTS AND SKMIFICANGE OF THE CONTROVERSY

While a large segment of the Adams Papers is

occupied with

protestations against selfish motivations of slaveholders, there
are also entries which dwell upon the long-range effects and/or
significance of the controversy.

Although he was rather one-sided

in his opinion toward the extension of slavery, John Quincy Adams
nevertheless felt that the contest was the beginning of a poten
tially disastrous chapter in American history.
he wrote:

On January 10, 1820,

"I take it for granted that the present question is a
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mere preamble — a title page to a great tragic volumeo"-^ As a
humanitarian Adams favored emancipation of the slaves, but as a
statesman he realized that such a move would result in a perilous
situation for the Union.

Adams knew that abolition could be effected

by the national government, but, in view of staunch Southern senti-

^^ibid.
3QMemoirs, IV, op. cit., p. 502»

^8
ments to the contrary, he also believed that dissolution of the
Union would be the price his beloved country would have to pay.
Division of the Union seemed too high a price for emancipationo
Adams' train of thought on this topic was stimulated by a
conversation with Secretary of War John C. Calhoun. The South
Carolinian did not think the controversy would result in dissolu
tion.

However, if the opposite were true, he thought that the

South would be compelled to enter into an alliance with Qreat
Britain.
status.

Adams replied that this would reduce them to colonial
Calhoun agreed and said it would nevertheless be necessaiy.

He continued by saying that the South would also militarize all of
its communities.

At this point Adams pressed the discussion no

longer and pondered the problem to himself.

He felt that if the

slave question produced a schism within the Union, "universal
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emancipation of the slaves" would be necessary shortly thereafter.
Adams did not elaborate further concerning "universal emancipation"
Nevertheless, it might be assumed that he meant emancipation of
slaves in all sections of the dissolved Union«
posed to do this is open to speculation.

Just how he pro

Perhaps he envisaged an

armed conflict — "a great tragic volume" in American history —
as being the solution.

Continuing his speculation, Adams believed

that emancipation might give rise to a gradual assimilation of the
Uegro into the more predominant white race.

^^Diary,

The Secretary found

op. cit., February 23, 1820.
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the entire issne quite perplexing and thought-provoking because it
presented him with a contest between his patriotic principles on
one hand and humanitarian ideals on the other.,

32

While Adams was noticeably disturbed by the controvert.
President James Monroe was exhibiting restraint and cautious optiBosm toward the subject.

The surprised Secretary envisioned three

alternative reasons for the chief executive's behaviors

(l) There

might have been some unknown movement under w^ with which the
President was familiar; (2) possibly he did not recognize the grav
ity of the problem; or (3) he had assumed auch an air in order to
lend stability to an otherwise hectic situationIn retrospect,
the latter seems the feasible explanation.
President Monroe later revealed his thoughts in a letter to
Adams.

The President conceived the controversy as a contest for

power rather than for humanitarian considerations.

He fully acknow

ledged the seriousness of the struggle and believed that it could
only be resolved by a compromise.

To him victory for either side

would prove detrimental for the Union.

lii

Several months before the chief executive's letter Adams
stated in his diary that the Missouri question had unwittingly pro
vided the basis for two new political parties, one pro-slave and the

32ibid.
33Memoirs, I?, o£. cit., p« ii99»
3^President James Monroe to John Quincy Adams, May, 1820,
Letters Received and Other Loose Papers, Adams Papers microfilm.
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other anti-slave.

However, Adams thought that the potential devel

opment of a new pro-slavery party was proving undesirable to both
•31^
Clay and Crawford because it threatened dissolution of the Union.
Adams obsei*ved that after the Speaker had helped dispose of the
problem through the Missouri Compromise, he fell upon more politi
cally profitable ground, e«g., issues such as the Florida treaty and
South American affairs
Though Clay had acted to preserve the Union, the Kentuckian
still believed that the Hepublic would soon be divided<>

Shortly

before the Compromise Clay stated that he felt that in five years
the Union would be separated into three distinct confederacies
At this juncture Adams commented no more on Clay's speculation»
After the Compromise of 1820 was passed, Adams made no men
tion of the Missouri question until November of 1820 when that state
submitted its constitution to Congress,

fhe Secretary was disturbed

by a provision in the document which would prohibit the settlement
of free Negroes within Missouri.

Adams recommended that the restric

tive clause be struck out by Congress because it denied free Negroes
their rights as citizens of the United States.

The Secretary asserted

that if he was a member of a state legislature, he would introduce
a declaratory act which would grant that so long as free Negroes
were deprived of their liberties in Missouri, white Missouri citizens

^^Diary, op- cit., February 20, 1820.
^^emoirs, V, op. cit., p. 53«
37lbid.. IV, po 525,
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would be treated likewise in his state.

Adams went even further by-

saying that he would not recognize a fugitive slave law if he was
a state legislator.

Terminating his commentary, he realized that

all of his proposed motions would be unconstitutional and would
lead to dissolution! however, he concluded by saying that the Mis
souri restriction would have been the first violation of constitu•3 O

tional principles.
In

addition to John Quincy Adams and James Monroe's remarks,

the Adams Papers also contain some relevant entries by Thomas Jeffer
son and John Adams.

All viewed the situation with alarmi yet no one

showed greater concern than the Secretary of State's father, John
Adams.

In his letters John Adams made repeated references to the

dispute.

Nor did he minimize the gravity of the issueo

Adams re

garded the debate as a controversy over the constitutional right of
Congress to restrict slavery.

Concerning this question, he asserted

that Congress definitely possessed that power.

39

Furthermore, Adams

contended that a majority of the inhabitants of Missouri actually
favored the Tallmadge amendmentLooking into the future, he
predicted that passage of the amendment would encourage more settle
ment in Missouri and would increase the state's land values0

Adams

^^Diary, op. cit., November 29, 1820.
•59

-^^John Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams^ Quincy, January 13,
1820, Letterbook of John Adams, Adams Papers microfilm^
^^John Adams to Jared Ingersol, Thomas Siper, Benjamin P.
Morgan, Robert Walsh, Jr., Robert Veruse, Quincy, December 9, I8l9,
ibid.
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accredited this prognostication to his belief that vast hordes of
freemen would stream into a slaveless Missouri while only a trickle
) *1
would come if slavery were allowed.
John Adams saw even graver consequences if slavery were per
mitted to expand.

The ex-president anticipated a series of slave

insurrections in which large numbers of blacks and whites would be
Ip
massacred.
In a letter to Jefferson he pondered the possibility
of losing Missouri "by revolt."

Regarding the controversy, he stated?

"From the battle of Bunker's hill to the treaty of Paris we never had
so ominous a question."

Thus Adams recognized its threat to the

Union, yet he, unlike his son, thought that the greatest peril to
the Union would result from an extension of slavery«

John Quincy

Adams, on the other hand, professed that a complete victo;ry for
either side would effect a national calamity =

Therefore, although

his humanitarian sympathies were with his father, he saw no choice
but a compromise.
Like John Quincy Adams and John Adams, Thomas Jefferson acknow
ledged the gravity of the controversy.

To Hugh Nelson he wrote?

"In

the gloomiest moment of the revolutionary war I never had any appre
hensions equal to what I feel from this source.

The apprehension

^^John Adams to Louisa Catherine Adams, Quincy, December 23,
l8l9, ibid.
^^Ibid., January 13, 1820.
^%.ester J. Cappon, editor, The Adams-Jefferson Letters (Chapel
Hill, 19^9), II, pp. 5U8-51i9.
^^Paul Leicester Ford, The Writings of Thomas Jefferson (New
York, 1899), X, p. l56.
~
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of which Jefferson spoke was not a fear of slavery but of how slav
ery was being used by politicianso

He believed that Federalists

had used the issue to resurrect their party along sectional lines.
Jefferson was afraid that this development would eventually lead
to a schism within the Uniono

He recognized slavery as an evil but

asserted that "spreading them jglaves] over a larger surface adds
to their happiness and renders their future emancipation more practicable."

Moreover, although he undoubtedly disagreed with the

Adams family's contention that slavery should not be allowed new
ground, he made no mention to that effect in his letters to either
Adams.
true.

In retrospect, one can see that Jefferson's forecast held
Both Adamses foresaw difficulties for the Union^ yet neither

realized, as did Jefferson, that dissolution would be caused by
individuals on both sides of the Mason-Dixon line.
men, Jefferson seems the least prejudiced.

Of the three

He appears to have been

able to perceive both sides of the complex questiono

In the aggre

gate, history proved Jefferson more correct in his assumptions.

C. JOHN QUINCY ADAMS' ROLE

Through his own admission, Adams took a rather passive role
in the Missouri controversy.^^ Yet, there was one exception to this
statement.

On March 3^ 1820, the day that both houses passed the

^%id., p. 172.
^^emoirs, IV, 02. cit. ^ po $02.

6k
Missouri Gomprotnise, President Monroe called a cabinet meeting for
the purpose of seeking counsel on the Missouri question =

The two

topics of discussion related to Congress' right to prohibit slavery
and whether or not the Compromise bill forever prohibited slavery
in states, as well as territories^ north of the 36 degree, 30 minute
parallel.

Concerning the first question, Crawford (the Secretary of

the Treasury), Calhoun (the Secretary of War), and Mlliam Wirt (the
Attorney General) believed that the Constitution made no provision
for that power.

The Attorn^ General added that he was opposed to

any acceptance of implied powers of Congress.

The trio further

contended that the congressional power to make needful rules and
regulations for territories referred only to jurisdiction over land
j ^ rj
and not its inhabitants.
Adams countered their argument by stat
ing that he believed that Congress had the constitutional right to
make needful rules and regulations over territorial settlers as well
)R
as their properiy.

Otherwise, Adams continued, that part of the

Constitution would be meaningless.
After their brief discussion on the first question, they turned
to the second matter.

Adams asserted that the prohibition of slavery

north of the 36 degree, 30 mimite parallel must apply to states as

Dairy, op. cit., March 3, 1820.
^®The constitutional principle which Adams was referring to
was the third section of Article four of the Constitution. This sec
tion reads s "The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make
all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other
Property belonging to the United States 5 and nothing in this Consti
tution shall be so construed as to Prejudice ar^ Claims of the United
States, or of any particular State-"
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well as territories because this was a condition for admission into
the Union, i.e., all prospective states north of the line must have
a slavery prohibition clause in their original state constitutions

J. 9

Crawford interrupted by saying that a state legislature could nullify
such an act.

The Secretary of State answered that an action of that

kind would be contrary to the Declaration of Independence which pro
vided for equality among men and a government controlled by the
governed.

He went on to say that it certainly would not be consis

tent with the Constitution for one segment of the population to make
slaves of another part of the populace.

Crawford said that those

words had been "attributed" to Senator King.-^

Adams responded that

it was the opinion of both King and himself and that he had not pub
licly expounded his feelings because he did not wish to add more fuel
to the controversy. Moreover, he added, it was also the sentiment
of those congressmen who voted for the slavery restriction and many
who voted against it.^^

After Adams had finished his short speech,

Crawford repeated his assertion that even the states of the former
Northwest Territory possessed the right to pass legislation which

^^Diaiy, op. cit., March 3> 1820.
^°Ibid.
-'^ Earlier Adams had alluded to the fact that the anti-slave
contingent of Congress was weakened by dissension within its own
ranks. Later, on February 28, 1821 (Memoirs, V, p. 307), he wrote
that anti-slave congressmen had possessed a majority before the
Compromise, but that "timid weak-minded" individuals switched
their votes in favor of the Compromise. Through this change of
votes, Adams concluded, the Compromise was passed by Congress.
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would prohibit slavery.
restraint.

At this point Adams felt he should practice

In his own loind he knew that the Ordinance of 1787 was

a "sacred," unbreakable "compact"| however, he thought it wise to
temper his remarks lest the executive be shaken by the same dissen
sion which had raged in Congress for several sessions. Adams chose
instead to state that the Ordinance had been passed by the Continental
Congress without the approval of the states, but that adoption of the
Constitution gave tacit

approval of the Northwest Ordinance.

In

short, nothing to the contrary was passed after 1787. Furthermore,
the Secretary of State once again repeated that the Constitution
invested Congress with the right to make rules and regulations for
territories.^^
Ifttth the termination of Crawford's remarks, the Attorney Gen
eral joined in the discussion by agreeing with Adams that Congress
did not possess the power to establish slavery where it did not
already exist.

At this juncture the President asserted that the

Constitution had, in fact, given Congress certain implied powers»
He added that the supreme law of the land had granted broad general
powers to both state and national governments.

As an example he

cited a congressional appropriation for the relief of Caracas earth
quake victims.

To Monroe's thinking this was a use of implied con

gressional powers.

Turning to the question at hand, he agreed with

Adams that Congress had the right to govern the inhabitants, as well as

^^Diary, op. cit., March 3, 1820.
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the land, of new territories.
After a few remarks on the Northwest Territory and the sub
sequent admission of several states therein, the President requested
without further discussion a short summation of each cabinet member's
opinion regarding the two questions.,

In reference to the second

question Adams mentioned that he would be forced to issue a negative
response if slavery was to be allowed in states above the proposed
boundary (referring of course to the right of a state to decide
whether or not to allow slavery).

Moreover, he felt that he would

be obliged to list the reasons for his sentiments. Crawford had no
objections but Galhoun thought that such a disagreement should not
arise.

As an alternative to the second question he suggested that

the President should rephrase the inquiiy to read whether or not the
eighth section of the Missouri bill was constitutional.

Thxis, as

Adams later explained, the other members would vote affirmatively
with the understanding that the second question applied only to
territories, and Adams would assent without any further qualifications.

Calhoun's suggestion was agreed to by the chief executive

and Adams quickly acted in accordo

Needless to say, although Adams

made no further mention of the meeting, it would seem that it ended

g3ibld.
^^Hence all cabinet members would answer positively to both
questions? but Adams voted affirmatively believing that states could
not permit slaveiy above the 36 degree, 30 minute parallel while the
others alleged that slavery could be allowed if a state passed an
enabling act. In short, Adams asserted that the Compromise line
related to both states and territories. On the other hand, the re
mainder of the cabinet thought that the boundary referred only to
territories.
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in an almost outright rebuff toward him.
It seems clear that the Secretary sought to prevent the
possible spread of slavery into states north of the compromise
boundary, but that the other members of the administration felt
otherwise.

It is unfortunate that Adams did not analyze the rea

sons for the cabinet's unanimity.

Nevertheless, it would seem

reasonable to assume that the executive did not wish to prolong
the controversy by vetoing the compromise measure»
In short, Adams' role throughout the Missouri debates was
largely passive.

In

spite of his strong opinion on the matter, he

kept silent to the public and relatively so to the administration o
Adams admittedly pursued this course because he did not wish to
promote dissension within the executive brancho

Nevertheless, he

did express his feelings to himself and a select group of friends.
In surv^ing Adams' conception of the controversy certain
contrasts in his character come to light.

There seem to have been

three or possibly four distinctive sides to his personality.
there was Adams the sectionalist.

First,

In his grossly oversimplified

manner he regarded Southern congressmen as selfish slaveholders.
With few exceptions (notably Middleton, Jefferson, Monroe, and
Calhoun) he seemed to categorize all Southerners in the same mold.
Little did he realize that only a small percentage of all Southern
ers owned slaves.

Nor did he show argr sympathy for the dilemma

which marcr slaveholders had inherited from their forefathers,
namely, their dependence upon the repugnant institution of slave
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labor.

On his side of the Mason-Dixon line Adams made little men

tion or criticism of what Southerners called "white slavery," i.e..,
factory sweatshop conditions in the industrial stateso
Closely associated to Adams' sectionalism was his humanitarianism.

Again in his one-sided viewpoint he regarded slavery or atty

extension thereof as absolutely and irrevocably abominable.

He

could see nothing but evil in the "peculiar institution" and in his
moral conscience he believed that it should be eradicated.

But

above both sectionalism and humanitarianism was Adams' Americanism.
He was realistic and patriotic enough to understand that at^ exclu
sive prohibition of slavery in the territories would promote a
schism within his beloved country.

Thus, against his sectional-

istic, and especially moralistic inclinations, he favored and sup
ported a compromise. In view of his staunchly puritanical temper
ament, it must have been a difficult decision to make.

Nevertheless^

through reading his diary and letters one senses that he was first
and above all an American.
Quite possibly, and in a much more subtle fashion, a fourth
side of his personality might be noted.

Unwittingly or not Adams

during this period was acting as the second most powerful figure in
the Monroe administration.

In such a capacity, providing the admin

istration retained its popularity, he would be the President's logi
cal successor in 1821;.

Therefore, it would be to his political

advantage to act in agreement lest he might lose favor as presidential
heir apparent.

Nevertheless, the latter conclusion that possibly
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Adams was also acting as a politician is only scantly verified in
the Adams lepers.
Regardless in what capacity — sectionalist, humanitarian,
patriot, or politician — Adams was motivated, history has shown
that his support of compromise was the correct course.

While the

Missouri Compromise did not prevent an eventual conflict, it cer
tainly helped forestall the event for forty years„

It seems quite

possible that without this interim period the Worth i-rould not have
emerged victorious in the War between the States.
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